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ABSTRACT 
The reliance on pacifist norms in Japan may have left irreparable effects on the 
country’s ability to police organized crime. Japan’s pacifist culture is due in no 
small part to its tumultuous history, but to fully understand the impact these and 
other norms have on domestic police and legal institutions we need study the 
evolution of this society’s criminal element over the last several decades and 
measure the effectiveness of the justice system in Japan.  
The major areas of research for this project will cover what and how 
institutionalized norms of pacifism have been used in Japan, comparing and 
contrasting the Pre-World War II and Post-World War II periods. This study will 
also analyze the shift in these norms and Japanese society over the last few 
decades and determine if the social norms relied upon in the past can still be 
utilized by today’s law enforcement agencies to maintain the country’s relatively 
low crime rate, address newer conflicts of domestic and international terrorism 
and manage the growth of organized crime within the state.  
From the statistics and information available on these past several 
decades I will evaluate how effective the Japanese justice system has been in 
responding to these new crime trends and whether or not the reliance on pacifist 
norms have debilitated the county’s ability to maintain law and order.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The reliance on pacifist norms in Japan may have left irreparable effects 
on the country’s ability to police organized crime. Japan’s pacifist culture is due in 
no small part to its tumultuous history; but to fully understand the impact these 
and other norms have on domestic police and legal institutions we need study 
the evolution of this society’s criminal element over the last several decades and 
measure the effectiveness of the justice system in Japan. The major areas of 
research for this project will cover what and how institutionalized norms of 
pacifism have been used in Japan, comparing and contrasting the Pre-World 
War II and Post-World War II periods. This study will also analyze the shift in 
these norms and Japanese society over the last few decades. It will determine if 
the social norms relied upon in the past can still be utilized by today’s law 
enforcement agencies to maintain the country’s relatively low crime rate, address 
newer conflicts of domestic and international terrorism and manage the growth of 
organized crime within the state.  
A. IMPORTANCE 
A country’s people are shaped by its norms as much as the state is 
shaped by its citizen’s normative behaviors. The Japanese people identify with 
the peaceful collective identity that they have cultivated over the decades. Social 
norms translate into legal norms in Japan’s justice system. As the collective 
identity becomes established, the institution defines the standards of appropriate 
behavior, and the individuals in the system are expected to conform and maintain 
the accepted actions creating social pressure to dissuade undesired displays.  As 
Katzenstein states, “Once institutionalized, norms do not simply express 
individually held preferences, values or ideas…They are part of an objective 
reality that often, though not always, commands some formal sanctioning 
 2 
mechanisms.”1 For the Japanese, law is not only a means to control behavior, it 
is a method to teach the masses what is “right”, or the correct way to behave and 
what is “wrong”, or incorrect. Still today, Japan’s police will release suspects’ 
names to the media to be publicized prior to arrest; not only for capitol offenses 
but also for such minor infractions as falsifying ones name or references on a 
lease. Social pressure is also a factor when judges sentence perpetrators. They 
must take into account the weight of social sanctions already experienced, and 
will often reduce the punishment given.2  
In the case of Japan, we have a stark contrast between how the state 
conducted policing and legal functions pre and post-World War II. The forced 
disarmament of the country and restructuring of the government, led to the 
state’s adaption of internal security to a “kinder, gentler” method of law 
enforcement in order to gain acceptance by the people. At the same time 
however, as the country began to industrialize after the war, we began to see the 
same urbanization patterns as with other nations, including increasing crime 
rates and the growth of organized crime.3 Thus, the country’s ability to rely on 
social pressures alone has become tenuous, leading to the question of whether 
or not Japan is prepared to deal with the nature of modern day crime. After the 
economic “bubble burst” of the 1990s, Japanese societal attitudes began to shift 
and coupled with the effects of globalization, organized crime began to expand, 
becoming more predominant with its activities; contributing to drug trafficking, 
bank loan fraud and its involvement in the human sex slave industry. From the 
statistics and information available on these past several decades  
                                            
1 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar 
Japan (Cornell University Press, 1996), 21. 
2 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar 
Japan (Cornell University Press, 1996), 26. 
3 A.J. Finch, “The Japanese Police’s Claim to Efficiency: A Critical View,” Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 33 No. 2 (May 1999), 503. 
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I will evaluate how effective the Japanese justice system has been in responding 
to these new crime trends and whether or not the reliance on pacifist norms have 
debilitated the county’s ability to maintain law and order.  
B. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES  
Japan’s system of utilizing social norms to maintain order in its society 
though effective in the periods prior to the economic down-turn of the 1990s, has 
led to the country being ill equipped to deal with the realities of today’s crime 
climate. Japan’s pacifist approach to crime control enabled the growth of 
organized crime in the country as well as corruption within the police system. 
Due to globalization, terrorism and international crime has become a prominent 
issue for many countries, with other states adapting to meet these new threats. 
Japan, however, continues to resist making dramatic changes to its legal system 
to prevent and control the spread of crime.  
To fully understand how Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA) has 
evolved and adapted its practices, this study will break down its history into two 
sections, Pre- and Post-World War II. Japan’s surrender and government 
restructuring by American military forces had a great influence on the country’s 
justice system in terms of the country’s conversion from “police state” to its 
peaceable enforcement system that continues into today. This study will  analyze 
the shift in society, the rise of crime rates and the dissolution of the Yakuza’s 
controlled behavior, over the last few decades.  It will also determine if the social 
norms relied upon in the past can still be utilized by today’s law enforcement to 
maintain the country’s relatively low crime rate and address newer conflicts of 
domestic and international terrorism, rampant human trafficking and the growth 
of organized crime within the state.  
The crippling defeat in World War II and the resulting occupation 
challenged Japanese belief in the patriarchal organization established through 
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the “police state” of the Meiji government and The Peace Preservation Laws. 4 
Cultural homogeneity was replaced by heterogeneity from imported American 
social practices and beliefs.5 Following the theory of social disorganization, 
“deviance and social pathology arise when institutionalized patterns of social 
behavior and informal social control are disrupted.” 6  This would translate into 
the rise of crime due to rapid social change, especially related to the organization 
of families and communities.  
The growth of the “new” police and the rise of organized crime in Japan 
have paralleled each other since the end of World War II. The government had 
put heavy obligations on the poorly equipped, inexperienced police forces, 
leading them to rely on local gangs to maintain order where it could not.7 The 
relationship between the police and the boryokudan, specifically the Yakuza, has 
been symbiotic, due to the broadly defined regulations the government has 
applied to them, depending on the gangs to regulate areas of crime like the 
“entertainment districts” rather than the police getting involved.  
With its namesake based in the worst possible hand one can derive in a 
traditional card game (ya-8, ku-9, sa-3), the organized crime syndicate’s origins 
can be found in such illicit elements of society as gamblers (bakuto) and nomadic 
peddlers (tekiya) banding together with the traditional bandits of the time. The 
bands evolved to accomplish more complex tasks, from booking to labor broking. 
Eventually, the Meiji government realized that these gangs could be enlisted to 
serve as a powerful form of deterrence to labor and political protests.8 The term, 
                                            
4 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar 
Japan (Cornell University Press, 1996), 50. 
5 David B. Carpenter, “Urbanization and Social Change in Japan,” The Sociological 
Quarterly, Vol. 1 No. 3 (July 1960), 162.  
6 Aki Roberts and Gary Lafree, “Explaining Japan’s Postwar Violent Crime Trends,” 
Criminology, Vol. 42 No. 1 (2004), 181.  
7 Harry Emerson Wildes, “The Postwar Japanese Police,” The Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 43. No. 5 (January-February 1953), 663.  
8 Peter B. Hill, The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, Law, and the State (New York: Oxford Press 
2003): 35–45. 
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boryokudan, translates more literally as “organizations or gangs that habitually 
commit violent illegal actions,” and is used throughout this thesis to refer to 
organize crime syndicates in Japan as a whole, including the Yakuza the 
country’s largest criminal organization.9 
A common practice by the government and police was to let organized 
crime police itself unless there was uncontrolled violence, and in return, the 
Yakuza are expected to cooperate with the authorities with other criminal 
investigations. Organized crime has become a more common fixture in society, 
and has even been glamorized over the decades, with criminal groups funding 
government parties to allow them the ability to remain in power, as well as 
intertwining themselves in legitimate businesses.  Recently, with its noted 
foothold in corporate sectors with foreign investments, and its expansion through 
globalized human trafficking and drugs, the country has begun a “crack-down” on 
the Yakuza.10 As the Yakuza’s accepted place in society changes, its methods 
and concepts of what is appropriate behavior have declined as a response to the 
effects of this social change.  
Japan prefers to concentrate its police and legal efforts into maintaining a 
relative “status quo” in regards to crime and terrorism externally as well as 
internally. The country seems to only treat the symptoms of the problem instead 
of addressing the root problems of an ever-changing society. My core hypothesis 
is that as Japan has experienced a dissolving of traditional social relations, it will 
come to realize that its previous forms of dispute resolution based on pacifist 
norms and tactics has become increasingly ineffective.11 My intention in this 
thesis is to assess how Japan’s social norms have evolved and affected the 
police and government’s pacifist response, fostering the growth of organized 
                                            
9 Frank F.Y. Huang and Michael S. Vaughn, “A Descriptive Analysis of Japanese Organized 
Crime: The Boryokudan from 1945 to 1988,” International Criminal Justice Review Vol. 2 (1992): 
20. 
10 Leo Lewis, “Yakuza Stalk Japanese Markets As Organized Crime Opens New Front,” The 
Times, August 28, 2008. 
11 Arthur Taylor von Mehren, “The Legal Order In Japan’s Changing Society: Some 
Observations,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 76 No. 6 (April 1963), 1175. 
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crime and ultimately hindering the justice system’s ability to function 
appropriately given modern day social trends which directly conflict with 
collective identity theory. Attempting to maintain an image of a “pacifist” society 
will ultimately lead to a further break down of the justice system and not allow the 
authorities to adapt appropriately to future domestic and international threats.  
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II. NORMATIVE BEHAVIORS IN JAPAN 
A. JAPAN’S INSTITUTIONALIZED NORMS  
Several contributing factors bolster Japan’s forms of social control in 
regards to law enforcement. First, Japan has a deep-rooted relationship with 
Confucianism, a philosophical belief system strongly based on moral virtue and 
humanity.12 Social harmony is a cornerstone of Confucian beliefs and is an 
underlying factor in Japan’s regulatory and constitutive norms. Dr. Peter 
Katzenstein describes regulatory norms as defining “standards of behavior,” that 
specifically shape the political aspects of an actor, such as the belief that Japan’s 
security policy should be pursued only by peaceful means. Constitutive norms 
describe the interests that shape an actor’s behavior. Regulatory and constitutive 
norms are closely linked to politics and how policy is formed in Japan. As an 
example, the pursuit of economic prosperity pushed by the state in the 1960s 
was embraced by the public, providing further support for the policies 
themselves. In turn, that ideal has now become incorporated into the collective 
identity of the people.13 
To maintain a pacifist state, Japan invokes strong informal social control 
mechanisms unique to the country.  Japanese society relies heavily on a premise 
dubbed by Travis Hirschi as Social Control Theory, which holds that the strength 
of social bonds to family, school and peers serves to deter individuals from 
committing crimes and deviant acts. Fear of being ostracized from the group or 
community (or the loss of prestige) regulates individual actions in a society that 
has put extreme emphasis and high value on group interaction. Appeasement 
and saving face are generally practiced, while bringing shame (haji) for 
committing deviant acts not only creates guilt for the individual, but causes the 
                                            
12 Arthur Taylor von Mehren, “The Legal Order In Japan’s Changing Society: Some 
Observations,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 76 No. 6 (April 1963), 1174. 
13 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar 
Japan (Cornell University Press, 1996), 18.  
 8 
entire family or group with whom the person is attached to be shunned for the 
action. 14In Japan, legal norms as a branch of social control matter much more 
than in other countries, with the bases that legal principles should “articulate what 
purports to be occurring in society,” rather than displaying what actually does.15 
Legal norms come into play when informal social controls breakdown and law as 
a doctrine of morality is no longer respected. The Japanese ideology of law 
however, is based more on reconciliation then punishment, preferring informal 
dispute resolution then formal adjudication and  not only seeing the event as 
challenging the harmony of Japanese society, but any further disruption as a 
continuance. This minimizes the ability for individuals to make substantial 
complaints or claims in some cases.16 
The law in Japan is used as a means to reinforce other methods of social 
control, but “requires consensus and a process for sanctioning that continually 
reinforce the existing social structure.”17 In the court system, prosecutorial 
discretion is very deliberate. It i meant to convict even before the judge can serve 
a decision, which would be aimed more at correction then punishment. Japanese 
law also centers  more on repentance in the form of confession and corrective 
behavior rather than detainment. This leaves Japan in a situation where the 
breakdown of traditional social norms has given way to the paradox of a legal 
system meant as a means to legitimate coercive control via public molding while 
becoming wholly ineffective as citizens no longer view themselves as part of a 
collective.18  
                                            
14 Aki Roberts and Gary Lafree, “Explaining Japan’s Postwar Violent Crime Trends,” 
Criminology, Vol. 42 No. 1 (2004), 180.  
15 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar 
Japan (Cornell University Press, 1996), 43. 
16 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar 
Japan (Cornell University Press, 1996), 43. 
17 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar 
Japan (Cornell University Press, 1996), 43. 
18 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar 
Japan (Cornell University Press, 1996), 44. 
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For Japan, globalization and culture contact become major factors in the 
transition of its society from harmonized collective to a society that has become 
more individualized. In the decades prior to World War II, we see a country very 
tightly controlled internally, limited in their contact with countries outside of their 
nation and in which information distributed to the masses is scrutinized carefully 
by the government.  As the country begins to open and transition based on a new 
imposed government approach towards citizens’ rights, we see the evolution of a 
mass media and how globalized economy allows social freedom where there 
was none before. During the period post World War II and during the economic 
“bubble burst” in the early 1990s, we see a clear transition of society changing, 
and social normative behavior shifting its attention from controlling a collective, to 
attempting to deal with individuals in society, social misfits and criminals, 
becoming organized and challenging what is demonstrated to society as 
“accepted behavior.”  
Japan’s system of utilizing social norms to maintain order in its society, 
though effective in the periods prior to the economic down-turn of the 1990s, has 
led to the country being ill equipped to deal with the realities of today’s crime 
climate. The country’s pacifist approach to crime control has led to the growth of 
organized crime in the country and the corruption of police and court systems. 
With globalization, terrorism and international crime has become a prominent 
issue for many countries, with other states adapting to meet these new threats. 
Japan however, continues to resist making dramatic changes to its legal system 
to prevent and control the spread of crime. Can a “non-violent” society maintain 
law and order in a world where organized crime has become increasingly 
brazen? 
 10 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF NORMS IN JAPAN  
PRE WORLD WAR II  
Japan began to see great change in government and society starting in 
the 1600s, the period that marked the rise of the government as a fully controlling 
power over all territories and not just limited to a central region. During this period 
of Japanese history, the Tokugawa regime began to rise, taking the place of the 
Emperor as the reigning authority, dissatisfied with the political deficiencies of the 
250 years prior. The regime moved the country’s capital to Edo, establishing a 
central national authoritarian government. Territorial governors and their families 
were relocated, with wives and children kept at the castle year-round, as if held 
hostage by the new regime to keep its personnel in check in order to remain in 
control of the regional lords. The Tokugawa also implemented the metsuke, a 
system of civil sensors and secret police to enforce the regime’s standing and 
pushed the country towards a policy of national isolation from the rest of the 
world.19 
The Tokugawa fervently pursued its idea of political stability “through 
highly organized regimentation and deliberate national isolation.”20 It also utilized 
the deliberate revival of Confucianism, applying the concept of class systems; a 
hierarchy of social standing by occupation  as well as controlling who was 
allowed to have weapons. Economic development flourished and industrialization 
began to thrive with the new orderly governance. Outwardly, feudal lands 
converted into expanding cities, and the military was downsized to a Spartan-like 
force due to the formal rule of law that was standardized throughout the 
territories.  
                                            
19 David B. Carpenter, “Urbanization and Social Change,” The Sociological Quarterly Vol. 1 
No. 3 (July 1960): 158. 
20 David B. Carpenter, “Urbanization and Social Change,” The Sociological Quarterly Vol. 1 
No. 3 (July 1960): 158. 
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Japan became a very controlled and in effect, peaceful society, embracing the 
start of urbanization with more citizens moving from rural villages to the growing 
central cities by the year 180021.  
A. THE MEIJI ERA 
Peace within the country came to an abrupt halt in 1853, when the United 
States’ Commodore Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay to conduct coerced trade 
negotiations with the government. These negotiations forced the Japanese to 
agree to several treaties and trade agreements, making them reopen ports to 
foreign visitation and commerce. This action made the Tokugawa regime seem 
weak to the public since it appeared unable to protect the country from foreign 
invasion.22  The discredited Tokugawa Shogun and staff relinquished power to 
the Emperor of Japan in 1867, making way for the Meiji restoration. The Meiji 
Empire was both “impressed and humiliated by the helplessness of the previous 
government in the face of foreign force.”23 The government took a stance of 
selective westernization, specifically in regards to the benefits of overwhelming 
military power in order to maintain its independence as a nation.  
1. The Meiji Police State 
When the Meiji Constitution was created in 1880, it created a period of 
totalitarian rule in Japan, with the Emperor titled as supreme commander 
strengthening the country’s military and creating a “warrior state.” Over the next 
few decades, the power of the military and state police expanded drastically, 
utilizing coercion and violence as methods to increase control over the populace. 
Citizens’ social lives were strictly monitored and the police force maintained 
observance over the entertainment districts, amusement businesses and even 
                                            
21 David B. Carpenter, “Urbanization and Social Change,” The Sociological Quarterly Vol. 1 
No. 3 (July 1960): 159. 
22 David B. Carpenter, “Urbanization and Social Change,” The Sociological Quarterly Vol. 1 
No. 3 (July 1960): 161. 
23 David B. Carpenter, “Urbanization and Social Change,” The Sociological Quarterly Vol. 1 
No. 3 (July 1960): 161. 
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factories.24 Police during this period were given judicial and quasi-judicial 
powers, foregoing due process in the conviction of any citizen perceived to be 
breaking the law or causing social disruption. “Between 1932 and 1937, 200,000 
to 300,000 suspects were punished annually for minor offenses.”25 The amount 
of police stationed in local areas grew; their primary purpose was to collect 
information on the residents in their assigned neighborhoods. The system 
consisted of 1,207 police stations, 4,847 police boxes and 14,324 residential 
police boxes established by 1930. The use of such tactics helped enforced social 
control over the populace.26 
As Communism began to filter into Japan in the 1920s, the Meiji 
government became agitated and ordered the dismantling of leftist organizations. 
Systematic suppression began in the late 1920s and by the early 1930s the small 
Japanese Communist Party was virtually obliterated. The momentum already 
established by the state continued, and the government began expanding its 
suppression to extreme right-wing groups and even religious organizations. 27 
The Peace Preservation Law, which gave the police far-reaching legal power, 
allowed the imprisonment and torture of numerous individuals so they could be 
reeducated and made into supporters of the Empire.  
In this Imperial Order, the idea was that “the government should be seen 
as the parent, the people as the children and the policemen as the ‘nurses’ of the 
children.” 28 The military were the guardians of external security and the police of 
internal security as well as serving as ‘teachers’ to the population. Police were to 
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ensure that nothing disturb the national polity; through the surveillance and 
reeducation of individuals, its work became the central role of the state itself.29 
The police were seen as violent agents of the state, with fear and oppression 
becoming a social norm within the country. Control over the population was 
maintained, but as brutality increased, the public began small uprisings. This 
“Reign of Terror” by the police state continued through the end of the Pacific 
War, and has even been considered a contributing factor to the “spiritual 
mobilization for war” that culminated in the Japanese expansion attempts.30 
B. THE GROWTH OF CRIMINAL INDUSTRIES 
The pre-World War II era also saw the development of the beginning of 
organized crime in Japan. During the Tokugawa period leading into the Meiji 
restoration, unorganized methods of illicit activities began to evolve; some 
becoming authorized practices, like prostitution, while others such as banditry 
began to mold into hierarchical gangs. While the Japanese government put more 
emphasis on control over the general populace, we begin to see the start of the 
symbiotic relationship shared between the state and crime. 
1. Legal Prostitution in Japan 
Prostitution was not a hidden occurrence in historic Japan; it was regarded 
as any other profession, even regulated by the state dating back to as early as 
the Sixteenth Century. Public and commercialized sex trade was a hallmark of 
the Tokugawa era, with government quarters given to prostitutes for servicing 
clients.31 The Yoshiwara Quarter (“entertainment” district) was established away 
from city proper in order to regulate the activity, and the government provided 
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licensing to control the shape of the industry.32 The sex trade, though legitimate, 
was considered work for women that came from impoverished backgrounds. 
Girls would be contracted to brothels to provide the family a supplement to its 
income. The term ianfu (“comfort women”) began as a reflection of girls that 
choose to engage in this profession in order to “help their family.”33 
When Japan began to expand its empire during WWII, it invaded 
neighboring countries such as China, Korea and the Philippines. Japan began to 
import women from conquered countries, to serve in the sex trade and as 
laborers. This was an important strategy as venereal disease became rampant 
among the local prostitutes, and one of the underlying themes of the war was 
based on protection of “family”. Thus, the importation of women for the purpose 
of providing for the sex trade, as well as labor from the conquered nations began. 
Women in conquered countries were forced to provide sexual services to the 
Imperial Army. They would set up “comfort” stations for the purpose of forced 
prostitution wherever deployed.34  
Ideally, Korean women were used due to their ‘racial closeness’ in relation 
to the Japanese, they were viewed to be close in likeness but deemed inferior. 
Indoctrinating foreigners as sex workers for the military at home and abroad 
allowed the Japanese to “protect” its women, as well as push for heterosexual 
behavior among the men, where homosexuality had been previously accepted.35 
The system of trafficking began to adapt, and persons became as common as 
any other commodity in a colonial system, being traded among the satellites to 
the home country. For decades after the fact, these crimes have been fervently 
denied and downplayed by the Japanese government.  
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The ministry has even stated that the treatment of these women was typical of 
actions performed by armies during any war in history.36 
2. The Start of Organized Gangs 
Some would comment that organized crime in Japan came more as a 
result of the policies implemented by the Meiji government, specifically the 
disbanding of the samurai class.37 While some gave into the Meiji state and 
attempted to reintegrate into the new social structures, others became outcasts 
and embraced illicit activities to support themselves, mixing into the criminal 
element already present in the country. This introduced element of leadership 
may have created the ties to unite the roving gangs and petty thieves at the time 
into the more organized structure that produced the boryokudan we know today. 
As Huang and Vaughn state, a “common element” shared between the now lord-
less samurai and the more high-class criminals, gamblers and extortionists as 
opposed to common thieves, was the declining social statuses shared by 
individuals due to the Tokugawa and Meiji social restructuring.38 The different 
skills brought by the diverse types of convicts that began to band together formed 
a network, now staking claim to specific areas of towns, and carving out 
territories.  
This subculture clashed with the society developing at large, but what was 
created was the beginning of a highly structured, loyalty based syndicate system, 
which had not been present before in the country. 39 
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF NORMS IN POST WORLD WAR II 
JAPAN 
The Meiji restoration lasted through 1945, with the Japanese Empire using 
its growing military forces to invade and capture Formosa, claiming it from China, 
defeating Russia and gaining territories in Manchuria and Korea. Leading into 
World War II, Japan had established itself not only as an independent nation, but 
also as a formidable force attempting to expand its empire to encompass the 
region.40 During the war, the United States applied strategic bombing and 
massive air raids to Japan’s mainland, killing upwards of 600,000 people and 
decimating civilian housing in the major cities.41  Compared to the Allies’ strategy 
in Europe, strategic bombing in the Pacific proved more horrific. Targets in 
Europe were typically surrounded by large sections of land as opposed to many 
of Japan’s crowded towns and suburbs. 42 Incendiary bombardment caused the 
wooden houses in the areas to catch ablaze and cause substantial collateral 
damage each time an attack was launched.  
The blockade of Japan’s harbor caused the country’s rapid deterioration. 
The island was deprived of major necessities such as food, clothing and even 
materials to construct military equipment. Japan had long passed the point at 
which it would be rational for a country to surrender. 43 This reluctance to end the 
war, along with Russia’s impending entrance, forced President Truman to rethink 
his strategy of ending this conflict without landing troops ashore for battle. The 
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as targets of industrial and military 
significance.  
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The first atomic bomb was deployed on August 6th, by a U.S. B-29 bomber in 
Hiroshima. On August 9th, a second atomic strike was delivered to Nagasaki. 
Shortly after these strikes, Japan surrendered unconditionally to Allied forces. 44 
A. OCCUPATION BY UNITED STATE’S FORCES 
The crippling defeat in World War II and the resulting occupation 
challenged Japanese faith in the patriarchal organization, which had been 
established through the “police state” of the Meiji government and The Peace 
Preservation Laws. 45 Cultural homogeneity was replaced by heterogeneity from 
imported American social practices and beliefs.46 Following the theory of social 
disorganization, “deviance and social pathology arise when institutionalized 
patterns of social behavior and informal social control are disrupted.” 47  In 
Japan, crime rates increased in response to disruptions to the prior social order 
and rapid change; especially when related to organization of families and 
community.   
1. Imposition of Pacifist Methods 
After a crushing defeat by the Allies and eighty months of occupation by 
American troops, Japan’s collective identity changed drastically. The country had 
been devastated by war, with many citizens homeless and starving at the time of 
surrender. Emperor Hirohito’s announcement of surrender after months of 
asserting Japan’s impending victory was almost an afterthought. General 
Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, was put in 
charge of overseeing the country’s reconstruction and rehabilitation.  
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His main concern was to ensure that change was introduced gradually in ways 
consistent with creating minimal social disorganization.48  
There was a general idea among the Allies that a removal of the social 
elements responsible for Japan’s aggression was necessary. It was noted that 
the public had been indoctrinated through fear and terrorization via the 
government institutions of the military, the police and education systems. It was 
widely perceived that in order for Japan’s transformation into a cooperative 
society was to be successful, none of these institutions could be left 
unmodified.49 To create a more passive nation, the belief was that it would be 
possible to channel Japan’s emphasis on group society, which was already 
reinforced by Confucian beliefs, as a means to restore social equilibrium.  
The United States wanted to ensure aggressive behavior was removed 
from the culture, and thus, it was impressed upon the Japanese that they were in 
an inferior position. Many institutions were rebuilt entirely in the American image 
of democracy, including the importation of Western law, which emphasized 
individualistic premises and general abstract principles.50 This directly conflicted 
with a culture whose past conflict resolution techniques were based on mediation 
or adjustment, as opposed to litigation, and where positions in a social hierarchy 
were considered factors in trial and punishment. This intrusive form of “culture 
contact” that occurred from the military occupation, much like the westernization 
that occurred after Japan was forcibly “opened” in 1856 by Commodore Perry, 
has had lasting effects on the Japanese culture. New social and legal norms 
were forced upon the country and were accepted by the crippled nation. Pacifism 
was not chosen by the people of Japan, but rather enforced by their occupiers. 51  
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B. THE EFFECTS OF URBANIZATION 
Social change not only occurred in Japan due to Allied occupation. The 
country had already begun major industrial growth and processes of urbanization 
even pre-World War II. The growing population had begun to migrate more to the 
cities to work and reside, and after the war, familism began to be corroded by 
individualism. Defeat in the war challenged the belief in patriarchal organization 
and cultural homogeneity was replaced by heterogeneity from the imported 
American social practices and beliefs.52  
In response, realizing the current police system no longer worked as a 
solely centralized institution, the government broke it down into prefectural units 
to better serve the public. The National Police Agency (NPA) was created to 
oversee, train and coordinate interprefectural police affairs, blending 
centralization and decentralization of political authority. The police became 
embedded in the community, performing a support role rather than a 
domineering one, with a mission not only to provide internal security and 
surveillance, but broadened to respond to the social needs of the people. 53  
1. Police Restructuring  
As the police began to integrate more with the local community, citizens 
created coextensive neighborhood associations to help establish a safe place to 
live.54 With the community’s assistance in policing localities, the police rarely had 
issues with maintaining low levels of crimes.. The police presence, in sharp 
contrast to decades prior, created a favorable public climate in which cooperation 
became common practice through “neighborhood watch” type associations in the 
community. Surveillance, which was once used more as a control method over 
the people, became socially acceptable and encouraged, Neighbors switched 
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from spying and informing on each other, to  watching for strangers and 
undesirable presences that may be noticed in the neighborhood.55 The phrase 
“Japanese society, in effect polices itself,” describes how the police and society 
integrated on the most intimate levels in order to achieve the common goal of 
security. 56  One of the methods the police utilized to incorporate itself more 
closely with the community was the establishment of Kobans, or police boxes, 
stationed throughout each neighborhood. With the formation of the National 
Police Agency (NPA), Japan restructured its policing approach to emphasize 
“local” presence as part of its “kinder, gentler” approach. Kobans were not just a 
manned police station, the boxes were actually full size homes, with the “office” 
portion in the front and a family style residence attached. The police officer 
assigned lived there with his family for several years at a time, this was not just 
an outside person that worked in the area, but a member of that neighborhood.57 
With a constant ‘friendly’ police presence in the local area, neighborhoods 
and towns created a rapport with local law enforcement personnel. This method 
began to establish trust in the police and government, which had been 
diminished prior to World War II when the Meiji government established a “police 
state” of rule for the country. 58 The idea that ‘violence doesn’t pay’ had also 
become a mantra, as aggressive methods were barely utilized in controlling the 
small amount of crime dealt with by the police. Non-violence steadily became the 
accepted social norm with the disarming and indoctrination of the country to the 
new pacifist methods of control.  
C. CRIME IN “NEW JAPAN”: POST WWII TRENDS 
The period directly after the end of the war until the formal completion of 
Allied Occupation can be seen as skewed with regards to crime statistics. The 
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state, anticipating that United States service members would become a fixture, 
actually legalized and regulated prostitution. A degree of disorganization resulted 
from the police system being dismantled and reconstituted; other crimes that may 
have been committed by occupying forces or other elements in society were 
therefore not recorded. The Allied forces had also enforced a certain amount of 
censorship through this period in order to control the information flow out to the 
general public, but after occupation came to an end in 1952, more tangible 
information became available for evaluation. 
1. Dropping Crime Rates  
The initial post war general crime rate sharply increased through 1955, 
and then only slightly declined until 1964 when it began to dramatically drop. The 
utilization of kobans and non-violent, community contact based methods 
embraced by the new police structure helped renew trust between Japan’s 
citizens and its police forces. Japan was able to establish internal security with 
only a negligible use of force, reaching its lowest point in 1973 leveling off and 
showing that the majority of crime was centralized in the city areas.59  Figure 1 
statistics taken from A.J. Finch’s article, The Japanese Police’s Claim to 
Efficiency: A Critical View shows the drastic difference in crime rates compared 
to other major counties using statistics for major crimes from 1960 and 1987. 
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Figure 1.   Comparative Crime Rates (N per 100,000 of Population) for 
Homicide, Rape and Theft in 1960 and 1987 (From 60) 
Japan’s methods of strong informal control coupled with the United States’ 
imposition of pacifist methods via culture contact, translated in a seemingly 
positive way towards the country’s low crime rate and the reintroduction of a 
population friendly police force. Japan seemed to transition through 
industrialization while avoiding the harmful effects that usually plague similar 
cases in regards to crime.  The social standards relied upon by the state began 
to weaken as the economy strengthened and organized crime took more root in 
the country as a common component used by the authorities to its own ends or, 
at the very least, simply accepted by the authorities.  
2. The Expansion of the Yakuza 
The post-World War II period is where the evolution of the Yakuza 
becomes truly defined. Much like we see with other forms of mafia, the group 
begins to capitalize on the deficiencies of the state, providing “protection” to 
various social groups because of the lack of attention from civil authority.61 The 
Yakuza also became intertwined with politics, as officials of the Liberal 
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Democratic Party enlisted the assistance of gangs in the 1960s to avoid 
anticipated violent uprisings by leftist groups.62 Such relations between politics, 
business and organized crime has continued over the years, with the Yakuza 
providing politicians with “private security” and funding to maintain control of the 
government system. In turn, these ties have prevented any major legislative 
movements against the gangsters for years. 
As the state scrambled to reconstitute itself under foreign occupation, the 
immediate post-war years were plagued with lawlessness. Coupled with 
economic deprivation, areas of the country were fret with anarchy. There was in 
fighting among the members of the criminal underworld, between the organized 
structured groups and gurentai groups, the street hoodlums. Both sides battled 
with each other to determine who would control the lucrative prostitution, 
gambling and drug industries growing throughout the nation. “Police 
countermeasures were minimal because of the Allied occupation and budget 
constraints.”63 By 1950, the boryokudan had established themselves as a 
powerful force in Japan with an estimated 5,216 gangs consisting of over 
184,091 members by the end of 1963. The syndicates had capitalized on the split 
attention by the American armed forces now fighting on the Korean Peninsula, 
and the money being pumped into the economy due to the war effort. Illicit 
activity grew, and prostitution and gambling reaching record levels. This period 
also saw the start of rival conflicts between the boryokudan organizations.64  
The presence of the boryokudan was palpable to society garnering 
concern from the general public as the criminal element was more present than 
ever before. Japanese citizens, now confident in their police force, encouraged 
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the NPA to respond to the rising threat. Between 1964 and 1970, the police 
started an anti-gang campaign by educating the general public on the negative 
effects of supporting or dealing with the boryokudan, and  informing the people of 
the anti-Japanese values the gangs embodied. This public relations plan 
stressed increased community involvement in order to ostracize members of the 
boryokudan from society, as well as labeling them outcasts. Interprefectural 
police cooperation was increased to help control the gambling and prostitution 
enterprises. During this period, gang membership saw some declination, but 
would see resurgence due to the economic woes inflicted by the oil shocks of 
1973 and 1979. During this time, groups associated with the boryokudan began 
to consolidate their power, absorbing smaller components to create “super 
gangs,” the start of the Yakuza.65 
a. The Yakuza and Prostitution in Japan 
When the war ended, with the impending United States occupation, 
the Japanese Government proactively set up available prostitution for incoming 
foreign soldiers. The Recreation Amusement Association (RAA) was established 
in 1945 as one of the first post-war actions, with the purpose of protecting 
Japanese women by the “sacrifice of others.”66 In a war-torn and impoverished 
country, marginalized women may have had no other choice but to engage in 
prostitution in order to survive. By 1946, however, the government had done a 
one hundred and eighty degree turn in policy, admitting that licensed prostitution 
was “in contravention of the ideals of democracy.”67 The women recruited by the 
government were now hunted down and incarcerated for the very actions they 
still needed to perform in order to survive. Making prostitution illegal did not stop 
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the practice but actually drove it underground.  Without regulation from the state, 
prostitution became a commodity of the growing gang sector.  
In 1956, Japan enacted Anti-Prostitution Laws in compliance with 
the American views of democratic values. Complications in maintaining this 
policy stemmed from the hypocritical enforcement of the new institutions. 
Although the government outlawed prostitution, Japanese citizens as well as the 
United States soldiers that were enlisted to assist in policing the personnel 
involved, continued to partake of the prostitution available with fees as low as 
300 yen (a bowl of noodles costing 600 yen at the time for comparison).68 As the 
industry began to be controlled by the Yakuza and become more and more part 
of the criminal underworld, government enforcement methods hovered even 
more in the gray area.  
b. Yakuza’s New Business Ventures  
With the government attempting to restructure the police system 
and conform to new methods of policing, the “new” National Police Agency had 
heavy obligations put upon it. Poorly equipped and too undermanned to properly 
enforce newly enacted laws, the inexperienced police force was led to rely on 
local gangs to maintain order where it could not.69 The relationship between the 
police and Yakuza began to become symbiotic, due to the broadly defined 
regulations the government had applied to them. They began to depend on the 
gangs to regulate areas of crime like the “entertainment districts” rather than get 
involved. The common practice was to let organized crime police itself unless 
there was uncontrolled violence. 
Vertical organization structure could be seen as one of the reasons 
why the police preferred working with the Yakuza. As opposed to dealing with 
‘unorganized’ criminal elements, having a hierarchy, as an option to negotiate 
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with, was a more favorable method then exhausting the minimal forces available 
in areas that arrests would be negligible. They were also perceived to have a 
“code” within the gang with their own set of rules to follow and a punishment 
system, which could be considered more effective than if members were arrested 
and processed through the legal system at the time.70  
What the National Police agency failed to take into account was the 
Yakuza’s expansion into criminal ventures that would have an effect on legitimate 
businesses. The gangs’ activities soon seeped outside of the controlled 
“entertainment districts”.  Atypical means of illegal income included involvement 
with real estate, banks and construction to add to the drug trafficking and 
gambling revenues. Figure 2 depicts the income percentages in 198871:  
 
Figure 2.   Boryokudan Income Sources, 1988 (From “Boryokudan no shikingen 
katsudou to torishimari nit suite” [Boryokudan’s Activities of Financial 
Resource and Its Countermeasures] by M. Tanaka, 1989, Sousa 
Kenkyo [Journal of Investigative Studies], 453(9), p.6)  
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V. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE RISE OF ORGANIZED 
CRIME IN JAPAN 
As nations begin to industrialize and modernize, they also urbanize, 
which, in turn, leads to growth in a country’s crime rate. Japan is no exception; 
the end of the Pacific War and the United States’ occupation and reorganization 
of the government began a new era of development for the state. With the 
expansion of industries, cities became Japan’s focal points. With a police system 
that still was considered unstaffed and underdeveloped; this gave way to 
organized crime compensating for areas where the government left the country 
deficient.  
Japan’s organized crime syndicates, the boryokudan, have evolved in 
parallel with the country’s globalization, engraining itself in the culture and 
economy. The Yakuza, Japan’s most expansive organized crime network has 
integrated itself in multiple facets of the economy, expanding the scope and 
complexity of its operation through legitimate businesses, real estate and the 
international stock market, as well as using globalization to advance its criminal 
empire through drug running and human trafficking. The influence of pacifist 
norms have directly affected Japan’s National Police Agency’s response to the 
introduction and growth of organized crime for decades and has translated in the 
Yakuza’s influence within the country and now abroad.  
A. THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION  
The growth of the “new” police and the rise of organized crime in Japan 
have paralleled each other since the end of World War II. The government had 
put heavy obligations on poorly equipped, inexperienced police forces, leading 
them to rely on local gangs to maintain order where it could not. The relationship 
between the police and Yakuza had been symbiotic, due to the broadly defined 
regulations the government applied to the gangs, depending on them to regulate 
areas of crime like the “entertainment districts” rather than involving the police. 
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The common practice was to let organized crime police itself unless there was 
uncontrolled violence, and in return, the yakuza have been expected to 
cooperate with the authorities on other criminal investigations. Even in modern 
day Japan, with a number of 1.8 police per every 1,000 people (compared to the 
United States’ 3.25) the relationship with organized crime gangs remains an 
intricate part of the system. 72 “The police tolerate traditional gang activities 
involving prostitution, protection rackets, and illicit businesses; however, when 
gangs traffic in narcotics, smuggle guns and injure innocent law-abiding citizens, 
the authorities are pressured to crack down.”73 
Organized crime has become a more common fixture in society and even 
glamorized over the decades, funding government parties to allow them the 
ability to remain in power, as well as intertwining itself in legitimate businesses. 
Recently, with its noted foothold in corporate sectors with foreign investments, 
and its expansion through globalized human trafficking and drugs, the country 
has begun a “crack-down” on the Yakuza.74  
1. Japan’s Bubble Economy 
The ability of organized crime to thrive is not unlike any other business. As 
the economic landscape evolved, the Yakuza had to adapt its practices to remain 
viable. The radical changes in Japanese economy starting in the late 1970s, and 
following into the 1990s, became a driving force behind the boryokudan’s 
methods. In 1986, as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) soared, asset prices began 
to increase. Stock and land price value ballooned in comparison to GDP, with 
interest rates beginning to show signs of forming a bubble. The Nikkei 225 on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange jumped from 8,800 in 1983, to its historical high of 38,915 
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just 6 years later in 1989.  Japan’s land asset value tripled from 139 trillion yen in 
1983 to 529 trillion yen in 1988. The Plaza Accord and global economic shocks 
such as the Black Monday stock market crisis of October 1987, contributed to 
low interest rates in Japan that helped fuel a vicious cycle of borrowing to 
purchase real estate; the real estate was then used as collateral to borrow 
money for more land purchases, resulting in exploding asset prices. By the start 
of 1990, the asset bubble burst, sending land and stock prices plummeting. 75 
2. The Boryokudan’s Involvement in The Bubble Burst 
Globalization and the bursting of the asset bubble directly impacted the 
boryokudan. Since they held a large amount of the bad loans issued by Japans’ 
banks, the Yakuza were linked directly with the financial downturn. Jusen, non-
bank financial institutions, relied on bank loans due to the fact that they could not 
accept deposits, and would relend the official loan to the customers. When the 
official institutions realized that the jusen lenders were offering better rates to 
consumers, they began to lower their own interest percentages. This forced the 
jusen companies to lend to higher risk customers, using land as collateral, 
causing the businesses to implode when land prices plummeted in 1990.76 It is 
estimated that the seven jusen collectively held 6.4 trillion yen in bad debt.  A 
sample of 93 jusen loans found that 40 were made to the boryokudan.77   
Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) also estimated that the boryokudan 
held roughly 5 trillion yen of debt from the jusen.78  Of all the bad debt resulting 
from the asset bubble, a conservative estimate is that 10% were made directly to 
the boryokudan and another 30% were made with businesses that had indirect 
ties to the boryokudan.  This posed a serious problem for banks that had 
                                            
75 Yukio Noguchi, "The "Bubble" and Economic Policies in the 1980s," Journal of Japanese 
Studies 20, no. 2 (Summer, 1994), 291–297.  
76  David Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza: Japan's Criminal Underworld (New Jersey: 
University of California Press, 2003), 199. 
77 Peter B. Hill, The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, Law, and the State, 185–187. 
78  Peter B. Hill, The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, Law, and the State, 185–187. 
 32 
previously relied on organized crime groups to enforce its debt collection.  Now 
that the boryokudan held a significant portion of the bad debt, debt collection 
became risky.79 
B. THE BORYOKUDAN’S RESPONSE TO JAPAN’S FINANCIAL DECLINE 
The boryokudan’s reaction to the effects of the “bubble burst,” was varied. 
The first was palpable violent change in its “code of conduct,” in which it would 
begin to lash out at financial institution lenders directly, as opposed to before 
where it would not harm “ordinary people.” As a result of the economic decline, 
the boryokudan left dozens of people dead, causing a rampant fear of organized 
crime that had not previously existed   in the general public.
80
 The most 
publicized attacks happened to heads of banks, such as the 1993 shooting of the 
Vice President of Hanwa Bank, Koyama Toyosaburo, as well as several 
Sumitomo Bank executives, all shot dead in their homes.
81
 Another response 
was to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the economic openings, 
including auction obstruction, the artificial lowering of property values, and the 
purchase of property without the intention to legally occupy or repay the lender. 
Other methods involved extortion of land bidders, and “loss cutting” whereby 
attorneys would negotiate on behalf of debtors to have its account dues reduced 
by the creditor. It was apparent that many of the creditors in these instances had 
Yakuza affiliations.82 
C. NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY’S RESPONSE TO A CHANGING 
BORYOKUDAN 
As a result of the boryokudan’s changing financial methods and violent 
trends, the National Police Agency (NPA) attempted to devise a strategy to 
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counteract the movement. This caused a fissure between the yakuza and the 
police, altering the existing contemporary relationship. The chaotic response to 
the “bubble burst” showed the NPA that the boryokudan could no longer be relied 
upon to contribute to a productive social environment.
83
 The first law enacted 
against the boryokudan was the Organized Crime Countermeasures Act in 1991.  
This law established prefectural safety commissions with the authority to 
designate groups as boryokudan and issue cease and desist orders and order 
punishment.  The law prohibits 11 forms of racketeering to include collecting 
protection fees, loan sharking, and acting as loss-cutting specialists.
84
 
Where America’s Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization (RICO) 
Act can indict an organized crime group’s leadership because of a continuing 
pattern of criminal activity, Japan’s Organized Crime Countermeasures Act did 
not have the same teeth, and was thus criticized internationally as weak, due to 
its limited scope and inability to enforce. Revised in 1993, the law was geared 
more towards why the policy was initially created, addressing more of the 
symptoms developed due to the “bubble burst,” specifically the issues created by 
the boryokudan’s tactics of credit manipulation and property devaluation. This 
was a breakthrough for the NPA, now allowing it to pursue organized crime 
specifically. 
On the other hand, the yakuza also responded to the new restrictions 
imposed on them. 
85
 
D. THE EFFECTS OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Shortly after Japan’s economic downturn, the region suffered another 
event that exacerbated crime and social unrest, the 1997 the Asian Financial 
Crisis. Japan was deeply involved, particularly through its monetary ties with 
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Thailand. Large corporations and financial institutions went bankrupt prompting 
Japan to inject 30 billion dollars into its financial institutions. 
86
 Fears spread that 
up to one half of the major banks would have to merge or close altogether. Non-
performing loan estimates for 1998 projected a total of 1 trillion dollars. Japan’s 
economy was once again rocked by economic troubles, stunting its growth, and 
earning the 1990s in Japan the title of “the lost decade”.
87
 
1. Contemporary Boryokudan Trends 
The Asian Financial Crisis illustrated how economic globalization had 
allowed organized crime new avenues of funding with the added benefit of 
anonymity associated with complex growing financial systems. The trends that 
followed the crisis include decreased transparency, with the numbers of 
“associated” members of the yakuza increasing in recent years, and the 
involvement of the group in numerous and diverse fund raising activities. These 
methods include the use of force to procure funds through the misuse of public 
benefit systems, fraud, extortion, robbery, and larceny.
88
  Furikome is an 
example of a new form of extortion widely used by the boryokudan (See Figure 
3).  Furikome is a scam that targets elderly citizens by pretending to be a relative 
and then asking them to send them money via an ATM to a criminal’s bank 
account.  These transactions are difficult to trace because the accounts are 
usually created under false names.  Along with the diversification of fundraising 
activities, boryokudan infiltrated new and legitimate industries such as 
construction, real estate, financial markets, and even government bodies.89 
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Figure 3.   Furikome Fraud (From: 90) 
2. National Police Agency Response to Contemporary 
Boryokudan Trends 
Following a decade of crime increase and a 160% spike in crime rates 
between 1996 and 2002, Japan passed a series of new laws in 1999 aimed at 
the boryokudan.  These laws provided stricter laws against organized crime and 
granted the NPA powers similar to those in the American RICO law.  The Law 
concerning intercepting communications in order to investigate crime provided 
the NPA the authority to conduct wire-tapping and exploit intercepted 
communications in order to prosecute boryokudan members.  The Organized-
Crime Punishment Law increased the severity of punishments of crimes 
committed in connection with the boryokudan and it also expanded the range of 
assets resulting from criminal activity that the police can confiscate.  The partial 
reform of the code of criminal procedure provided better protection for those 
involved in criminal prosecutions.
91
  In 2003, the Japanese government launched 
the Action Plan to Create a Crime Resistant Society (APCCS), which contained a 
category for the protection of the economy and society from organized crime.  By 
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2008, the anti-organized crime laws and the APCCS along with improvements in 
the economy after the Asian Financial Crisis resulted in a 33% decrease in the 
crime rate since 2002.  The boryokudan dominated criminal activities such as 
money laundering, stimulant offenses, and gun-related offenses decreased while 




Figure 4.   The number of recorded penal code crime in Japan (1990-
2008).(From 93) 
As crime took an upturn, the National Police Agency was also plagued 
with various scandals involving embezzlement and clearance rate falsification.
94
 
The NPA attempted to blame the increase in crime on foreigners and juvenile 
offenders, with minimal success, and growing dissatisfaction with the police grew 
throughout the public.  
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Figure 5.   The rate of people who feel positively about Japanese public safety 
(National Poll 1998–2009).(From: 95) 
The country’s mistrust in the police stemmed from the violent or 
oppressive tactics of the state in the decades pre-World War II and was now 
based in its lack of confidence in the institution’s capabilities and intentions. The 
Japanese people began to resent the police and resistance to assisting officers 
began to take effect. Public perception and opinion became a focal point of the 
state in building-up citizen-police relations again trying to regain legitimacy. 
As Katzenstein states: “For the Japanese police the belief is axiomatic that 
success depends largely on a favorable public climate.”, he cites the example of 
how the police responded to student unrest in the late 1960s. Though there was 
provocation, crackdown was delayed until public opinion swayed in support of the 
government. The police were weary of using violence in the confrontation in 
order to prevent sympathy for possible martyrs. 96   
The only way a police institution can function by primarily using pacifist 
methods is to rely on the controlling social norms to remain stable. With a more 
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current drop in support, the normative behavior of respect and submission to 
authority was now met with apprehension. The system’s forensic policies also 
come into question, autopsies are only preformed in 11.2% of deaths, and police 
discourage medical examinations of the bodies’ post-mortem to avoid a possible 
homicide investigation.97  
Today, Japanese police have had to rely more on technological 
advancements to assist them in controlling crime. As crime has begun to 
decrease, polled favor has increased slowly, but there is a general consensus 
that crime is still becoming a major problem in Japan. This may be due to 
increased media attention and the availability of information received readily via 
the internet. Increased reporting on the part of the population in some areas 
contribute to police crime clearance rates, which allows the NPA to garner favor 
again among the general public as shown starting again post-2005.98  
E. MODERN DAY ORGANIZED CRIME ISSUES 
Japan faces a breakdown in its reliance on social control reliance with 
today’s population. More violent crimes have been occurring particularly among 
the younger generation in Japan with a noted growth in “youth gangs.” As stated 
by Joachim Kersten, “In this environment of conformity, the deviant style of you 
groups, cliques and gangs guarantees public attention.”99 Where before gang 
style crime like those conducted by the yakuza had its own “code” of ethics 
among gangsters, today’s members no longer have the same restraint or respect 
for authority, even within the gang, as it had in decades prior. Along with 
maintaining control in its own groups the yakuza received freedom from the NPA. 
In return, the yakuza were expected to cooperate with the authorities on other 
criminal investigations, keeping drug importation manageable and helping 
prevent foreign prostitution from flooding the country to maintain control on 
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domestic pricing and restrict the outbreak of AIDS in the 1980s and 90s.100  With 
the previously noted nation-wide crack-down progresses, there has been an 
obvious difference in the relationships between the police and yakuza. As 
Adelstein states: 
Its antagonistic attitude toward the police- collecting information on 
them, not allowing detectives into the gang offices for a chat, not 
confessing, goes against the unwritten rules of how yakuza get 
along in Japan.101  
This deterioration in the control the police have, as well as the Yakuza’s 
own control of its personnel within the system can be used as a barometer for 
future management of crime in the country.  
                                            
100 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar 
Japan (Cornell University Press, 1996), 66–67. 
101 Gavin Blair, “Japan’s Yakuza Mafia Faces a Crackdown,” The Christian Science Monitor, 
July 27, 2010.  
 40 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41 
VI. THE STATE’S PACIFIST RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL 
CRIME 
In the case of Japan, their pacifist approach to law enforcement has 
extended to transnational crime and terrorism. Globalization has forced Japan to 
be confronted with the same illicit behavior performed by transnational culprits as 
other countries. Instead of confronting such elements, it has taken a position of 
avoidance or abatement rather than mitigation. Japan’s pacifist normative 
behavior not only has fostered the growth of organized crime domestically, its 
inability to be effective in policing such criminals has allowed the yakuza to 
expand globally.  
A. INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING 
As a result of the success the yakuza attained in its country, its 
intermingling with foreign crime has increased throughout the decades to include 
global drug running and human trafficking. Methamphetamine has been the 
major drug of choice starting in the 1970s; other synthetic drugs such as LSD 
and ecstasy have become increasingly popular and an import of choice in Japan.  
Working with other major crime syndicates in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong China 
and even Iran, the yakuza have utilized them as importers in the stimulant 
trade.
102
 After the “bubble burst” of the 1990s, the collapse of the economy stilled 
revenue from real estate and stock speculation, driving the yakuza’s push in drug 
and human trafficking as a means to maintain financial inflow.  Approached by 
the United States in the 1990s to request assistance in curbing international drug 
trafficking, Japan only reluctantly agreed to some enforcement agreements, 
worried that the methods and restrictions the United States were requesting 
would hinder other aspects of its international trade.  
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B. HUMAN TRAFFICKING TODAY AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZED CRIME 
GROWTH AND STATE PACIFISM 
When Japan’s economy took-off in the 1980s, there was an increased 
demand for minor wage earners in the growing bar and club businesses. This 
began an influx of illegal immigration via organized crime channels to fill these 
and other low-end work positions.
103
 Due to the rapid financial growth of Japan in 
the 1970s and 1980s, the demand for entertainment businesses began to 
increase as well. In order to accommodate Japan’s “semi-legal” sex 
entertainment industry, the country had an in-flood of foreign women via 
immigration and human trafficking through organized crime to provide for bars 
and strip clubs. The yakuza and Japan’s sex industry became intermingled; with 
the yakuza filtering in foreign women under the guise of legitimate work, creating 
a system for the modern day enslavement of people to feed this institution. 
104
  
There are approximately 2.5 million people in the world that are 
considered to be in a trafficked status, being in forced labor situations to include 
sexual exploitation. Asia and the Pacific dominate this statistic with 56%, 1.4 
million people, currently counted.
105
 In Japan’s case, there have been glaring 
issues with the trafficking of persons, specifically women and children for use in 
their sex industry, and importation of persons to supplement intensive labor 
industries, being defined as “destination, source and transit country,” which 
attributes to its Tier 2 status in the State Department’s Trafficking of Persons 
report.
106
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a. TIER 1 
Countries whose governments fully comply with the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum standards 
b. TIER 2 
Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA’s 
minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into 
compliance with those standards 
(1)  TIER 2 WATCH LIST.  Countries whose governments do 
not fully comply with the TVPA’s minimum standards, but are making significant 
efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards AND:  
a) The absolute number of victims of severe forms of 
trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing. 
b) There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts 
to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year. 
c) The determination that a country is making significant 
efforts to bring themselves into compliance with minimum standards is based on 
commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year. 
c. TIER 3 
Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the 
minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so 
2. Standards without Enforcement 
Japan’s 1956 Anti-Prostitution Laws and its Labor Standard Laws suffered 
from lack of enforcement and prosecution. In the case of labor violations, when 
caught committing such offenses, employers typically settled out of court or were 
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fined by the government in order to avoid prosecution. A highlighted case in 2010 
by the Labor Standards Office involved a Chinese man, only 31 years of age, 
who had been worked past the point of exhaustion and consequently died. The 
company involved was given a fine of only a few thousand dollars as 
punishment. Most personnel that have been identified as victims are treated as 
illegal immigrants and simply shipped back to its country of origin with no real 
compensation or assistance by the state.
108
 
In 1998, it was estimated that there were more than 150,000 foreign 
women prostitutes in Japan; half Filipinas and approximately 40% Thai.
109
 More 
recent information from the 2008 Human Rights Report noted that human 
trafficking was still a prominent issue for Japan with victims from China, the 
Republic of Korea, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America. Most 
women are lured to Japan under the pretense that they will be working as 
entertainers or club hostesses, not realizing that the people offering the work 
have ties to the yakuza. 
3. Pacifism from Past Preconceptions 
Japan joins failed states in the rankings that include such issues as failure 
to respond or prevent to such crimes as sex and labor slavery. To understand 
why a country that is considered a world leader and revered for its pacifist 
methods and low crime rates has been so delinquent in this area we must take 
into account the historical and normative perspectives that have created a 
society that seemingly disregards this area of human rights. History cannot be 
the only reason for Japan’s aloofness to its human trafficking issue. We must 
look at how it considers prostitution in regards to the sex industry. Lie describes 
the action in his article as: sex work being used by the state as a form of political 
economy, concentrating more on the dynamics between genders pre- and post- 
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World War II. He colorfully describes the state as the “pimp,” with its power over 
women’s sexuality in a patriarchal state serving as a form of control and another 
way to subjugate the populace.110 Leheny determines how this position took root 
back to how Japanese culture considered the relationships between men and 
women in the Nineteenth Century, pointing out the new expectation of a marriage 
being platonic, creating a sense that sexual activity (past the point of 
reproduction) was considered as dirty. He specifically points out the dynamics 
between children, noting that children were grouped based on social status as 
opposed to age111; fortifying the idea that sex work involved only impoverished 
people. We see the parallel as stated before with the comfort women, where the 
dehumanization of individuals makes the action more prohibited in the minds of 
the consumer.  
4. Modern Day Issues 
Even with the Anti-Prostitution laws enacted in 1956, by 1998, Japan’s sex 
industry had grown to the point of generating a yearly revenue equaling 1% of 
the GNP, the same amount that is allotted to its country’s defense budget.112 
Along with the inflow of foreign sex workers, Japan has noticed a major rise in 
the amount of young teenage females becoming “part-time” Japanese sex 
workers. Most of these females are identified as high school girls, termed as 
kogals, that perform sex acts as well as play dating to supplement their 
disposable income in order to purchase high-end material goods. Initially unsure 
how to approach this growing concern of young females acting so improperly, the 
common consent among the Japanese is that the girls are being rebellious and 
that their actions are their own fault.  
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Japanese society thus sees these young women as endorsers of criminal activity 
as opposed to recognizing them as victims of the system.113  
Trafficking is not just considered a problem within the country; it is noted 
that Japanese men have been and still are a major contributor to the demand for 
sex tours abroad, specifically child tours in Southeast Asia. In addition to 
trafficking through illicit channels there has been a rise in immigrants being 
brought to the country under fraudulent marriages as an entrance into forced 
prostitution rings and through foreign “trainee” programs for labor purposes.114 
Much like with sex trafficking, labor trafficked persons are brought to the country 
under the false presumption of legitimate work, only to have their identification 
and visas taken from them and made to operate under unsafe working 
conditions.115 
As emphasized in the United States’ State Department Human Trafficking 
Report, Japan as a country has “failed to address government complicity in 
trafficking offenses.” The government’s neglect in protecting identified victims has 
been sub-par, indicating a disregard for the person’s exploitation and 
ineffectiveness in mitigation of the acts involved in trafficking. The Anti-
Prostitution Laws themselves are obscure, criminalizing the functions affixed to 
sexual service with the exception of the transaction itself.116 The care provided 
by the state is extremely faulty, shelters and services provided vary from place to 
place, and the victims are often treated more as accomplices, having their 
movements restricted and are only provided counseling in few reported cases. In 
the event that a victim tries to press charges, the government does very little to 
help the individual. No funds are given to the victim to sustain themselves while 
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trying to navigate the legal system, and with no legitimate work visa available to 
the “illegal immigrant”, the women are forced to depart the country with no justice 
found.117 
5. Possible Reason for Apathy 
Where Japan is concerned, many still question why such a respected 
nation that seemingly values respect and human rights still has such an issue 
when addressing the blatant issues in regards to trafficking of persons. One of its 
major faults in this area may have to do with its “shame based” society. In the 
case of human trafficking in Japan, we can be led to believe that it chooses not to 
aggressively pursue or enforce prosecution or education on the subject due to 
the complicity of Japanese citizens, who must be consumers of the product in 
order for the industry to be so large. Admission of such involvement in devious 
acts would cause guilt among the society; hence, feigning obliviousness to the 
problem is more tolerable then coming to terms with such fault.  
As Huang and Vaughn state, “there is a paradoxical relationship between 
boryokudan gangs and society at large.”118 Though the Japanese do not 
condone the yakuza’s more violent behaviors, they fill the function in its society to 
satisfy the demand for gambling, pornography, prostitution and stimulant drugs. 
Huang and Vaughn summarize the relationship between the yakuza and society 
in regards to immoral behavior by saying: 
This arrangement allows the average Japanese to avoid self-
introspection and accountability for individual indulgences while at 
the same time attaching an ambivalent attitude to boryokudan 
gangs for providing these illegal services.119 
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If Japan is expected to make the proper adjustments to its approach in 
preventing and prosecuting human trafficking, the country’s citizens must 
embrace the obvious accountability it has as a society. Without addressing this 
reluctance to properly pursue perpetrators and protect victims, Japan will 
continue to be a Tier 2 country in trafficking on a global level.  
C. PACIFIST APPROACH TO SEX CRIMES BETWEEN JAPANESE 
CITIZENS 
In many cases in Japan, sexual crimes among its own citizens, such as 
rape, molestation and harassment go unreported due to the stigma still attached 
to the act in regards to the victim. Attitudes involved with the act were to treat it 
as “natural” sexual behavior in some situations for young men, conversely, the 
shame produced by the encounter for the woman was seen as harmful to future 
marriage prospects, so the event would go without being recorded. Even with 
improved clearance rates reported the last few decades, the shame on the part 
of victims still discourages them from addressing the crime to the authorities.120  
D. THE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 
Terrorism and violence-prone social movements have littered Japan’s 
history despite the country’s low crime rate. Japan has experienced hundreds of 
domestic bombings and “guerilla” attacks in the last several decades. These 
include the 1986 rocket attack by left wing-organization chukaku-ha, on the 
palace during the Tokyo summit, the 1995 sarin gas attack in the subways of 
Tokyo, as well as more than 200 domestic bombings between 1969 and 1989. 
The country’s counterterrorism policy is based on the same premise as its Peace 
Constitution, focusing on root causes as opposed to the immediate act of 
terrorism. Japan has been notorious for pushing international terrorists out of the 
country to other countries, while it is less willing to assist with the response to 
terrorism as part of a global problem. For example, the Japanese Government’s 
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response to the JRA plane high-jacking and passenger kidnappings was 
complacency, when confrontation seemed unavoidable, Prime Minister Takeo 
Fukuda decided to pay ransom to release JRA cadre from prison and proceeded 
to issue blank passports to resolve the situation.121 
Katzenstein states, “Concepts of self and other define the standards of 
appropriate behavior that govern Germany’s and Japan’s counterterrorist 
policies.” He relates in his article that institutionalized norms of concepts of “self” 
and “other” inadvertently enhance terrorist issues for other actors. Japan in 
particular has a policy of “avoiding bloodshed,” preferring to appease terrorists by 
paying demanded ransoms and only tepidly supporting the “no-concession” 
policy. 122  This passive approach to threats seems to work for internal 
skirmishes and has allowed them to avoid conflicts with terrorism on a global 
level, but Japan has received external pressure from other international 
organizations to push for more involvement in terror deterrence, although this still 
meets with reluctance from the Japanese public. 
E. TERRORISM AND THE STATE 
Institutionalized norms, specifically Japan’s “pacifist” image, drive how the 
country creates and interprets its antiterrorism policies. The Japanese people’s 
pacifist identity affects what actions it perceives as external and internal threats, 
making them willing to downplay events internal to the country in order to avoid 
causing alarm and political disfavor as well as brushing off international terrorism 
by arguing that such issues are not the country’s concerns.123 Such 
internalization can be drawn back to post-World War II isolation, remaining 
occupied and allied with the United States; Japan had little direct contact with 
other countries without the United States purview. In regards to the growing 
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issues of terrorism in later decades, the establishment of ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) created a situation where neighboring countries 
focused on domestic issues and not international engagements.124 This regional 
approach fostered Japan’s posture that what occurred outside of its borders need 
not be addressed. 
The typical Japanese definition of terrorism is grouped into how it views 
other social problems, with events classified more under crisis management then 
response to anarchy. The National Police Agency still suffers from a lack of 
intelligence gathering capabilities as well as the structure to deal specifically with 
terrorism. Policy is related more with how peace and human rights are affected 
then being clearly defined as counterterrorist and is left out of public debate. 
When compared to the United States in regards to counterterrorism, Katzenstien 
quotes that: 
Japan is more methodical, less willing to create alarm by preparing 
for crises, more sympathetic to the root causes of terrorism, and 
less willing to respond to terrorism as a global problem.125 
In many cases, when international terrorists are a cause for concern within 
Japan, the government will press for them to be pushed out of the country rather 
than confronting the problem directly. With the events of September 11, 2001 
bringing global terrorism to the forefront, and testing the bonds of the U.S.-Japan 
strategic alliances in some areas, Japan has been forced to embrace a more 
partnered method to dealing with terrorism. Working more closely with 
INTERPOL (International Criminal Police Organization), the nation has begun to 
recognize the impact that terrorist networks have on a worldwide scale.  
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F. TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 
In regards to transnational crime, Japan has embraced partnerships 
outside of its borders in order to contain issues caused by syndicates originated 
in the country. As stated in Chapters III and IV, Japan’s well known organized 
crime syndicate, the yakuza, has branched itself into the global markets of drug 
smuggling and human trafficking with little regulation by its own government. 
With links to China’s Triad as well as syndicates in Korea, the yakuza have 
become a larger globalized issue affecting Asia as well as other regions. Where it 
lacks proper connections on a multinational level, the National Police Agency has 
cultivated connections from its neighboring countries of China, Thailand, Taiwan, 
Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia along with high-level relations with South 
Korea and the United States to facilitate intelligence gathering and pursuit. 126 
One theory as to why Japan is so aggressive in its pursuit of transnational 
crime in comparison to its passive pursuit in confronting terrorism is the palpable 
affect that such international crimes, especially drug trafficking, have on the 
country. Because of the high standard of living making Japan distinct in a 
relatively poor region of the world, Japan has become a major target for 
international dealers.
127 As opposed to its unresponsive actions towards human 
trafficking, the country has recognized the negative impact such activities has on 
its society. Japan also may feel more shame for the yakuza’s actions in regards 
to the international stock market, real estate scams and bad loan ventures, 
because they are in open view of the global community.  Issues such as 
terrorism relocation and human trafficking are not as publicized as a problem with 
the country and are therefore not as actively confronted by the state. 
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VII. CONCLUSION- EFFECTIVE POLICING, OR A SOCIETY 
LYING TO ITSELF? 
In an effort to maintain the non-violent, less militaristic image to avoid pre-
World War II connotations, Japan has only succeeded in creating a system of 
contradiction. The nation has touted its low crime rate but has also come under 
scrutiny in recent years for claims of statistics falsification and misreporting 
crimes. There have been cases of numerous stations underreporting crimes 
around the country and offices targeting individuals already possessing criminal 
records already with charges of unrelated crimes in order to improve its 
clearance rates. Reporting procedures have been skewed as well, as Japan 
continues to be a society where shame and saving face remain a prominent 
concern.  
A. COUNTERARGUMENTS: “PLANNED CHANGE?” 
As Carpenter points out, Japan has gone through several major shifts in 
how it approaches governing its society.128 In some cases, these changes were 
“planned” such as the Tokugawa, Meiji and even the United States’ approaches 
to remolding the nation. In the cases of the Tokugawa and Meiji, Carpenter 
states that the changes were forced and indoctrinated by the sitting 
governments, and eventually fully accepted by the people with only the instances 
of “culture contact” that forced a shift in authoritative measures and policies. 
Without the intervention of a foreign presence creating an event or interfering 
with how Japan conducts its domestic and foreign actions, we must assume that 
the counterfactual Japan of today would most likely still be an authoritarian 
governance, and militaristic rather than “passive.” Many may wonder how Japan 
was able to make a 180-degree change from its pre-WWII Imperialistic identity 
into the pacifist nation it is today. I posit that Japan as a country, until recent 
decades, was hard-wired socially to accept whatever governing choices the 
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leadership imposed, with bases rooted in “social control theory,” constitutive 
norms and underlying manipulation of Confucius beliefs. 
Where successive Japanese governments have relied on such controls to 
retain dominion over society’s behavior, they have been unable to properly 
evaluate the collective social shift that has occurred in the past decades, 
because of globalization and the general dissociation new generations feel 
towards the collective body. As Japan becomes more heterogeneous through 
genetics, culturally and economically, the government becomes increasingly 
unable to handle the autonomy its people are displaying. The breakdown of the 
law enforcement model relying on the organized crime collective is a distinct 
example of how prior approaches to governance will no longer work in modern 
Japan. These “unplanned” social evolutions due to urbanization and globalization 
cannot be judged with such a narrow focus on maintaining the status quo.  
B. ARE THE POLICE METHODS TRULY “PACIFIST”? 
One of the major concepts examined during this study, is the idea of 
pacifism and whether or not the methods used by the Japanese Police can be 
truly considered “pacifist.” A common idea of the definition of pacifism is, “to 
avoid the use of force or, using non-violent methods to achieve one’s goals”. In 
Japan, guns are strictly prohibited for all except law enforcement, military and 
sportsmen, which immediately de-escalates the potential for forceful conflict in 
most situations. Physical violence is rarely needed in most cases of police 
response and only in controlled amounts. The government retains a very loose 
hold on the police.  The legal framework that the police operate under, allows an 
‘enabling’ environment in respect to its investigative procedures.129  
Working under the National Public Safety Commission, the NPA has 
relative political and operating autonomy, allowing the police carte blanche when 
pursuing criminal investigations. Though the justice system has gone through 
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reforms over the decades, it still relies heavily on the policy of confession being 
the “King of Evidence.”130 Securing a confession from a suspect ensures a 
minuscule acquittal rate for the Japanese courts and positive statistics for police 
case closures. The legal environment provides the police opportunity for 
unlimited and unrestrained questioning of suspects. As Finch relates in his 
article:  
Interrogation may be conducted on an unarrested suspect at a 
police station or police box on the basis of Article 2 of the Police 
Duties Execution Act, and Article 198 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. Article 2 of the Act allows a police officer  to stop and 
question any individual when there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the individual has just committed a crime or has 
knowledge about a crime which has been or will be committed. 131  
This form of on-the-spot questioning is not considered to be detaining an 
individual and is not included in the set time limits of indictment. During 
questioning, a suspect can be subjected to psychological and physical pressure, 
and a person can be subjected to questioning at any time, day or night with no 
regard to meal consumption or sleep. Legal counsel involvement is very limited 
and in many cases, a statement will be written by an investigating officer and 
signed by the suspect.132  
Detention is another method by which police can coerce a confession from 
a suspect. An individual can be held for three days, prior to seeing a judge. 
Pending a trial a judge can send the person to a detention facility for up to 10 
days, which is usually extended. Where there are plenty of facilities capable of 
housing the suspect, the police will typically enact a method called daiyo-
kangoku or “substitute imprisonment” which was utilized in the early 1900s when 
there were a shortage of holding facilities. This action allows the arresting police 
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to hold the prisoner with them as opposed to being transported to the required 
alternative facility. While still in its custody, the suspect can be subject to even 
more questioning until a confession is obtained. Physical abuse is not 
uncommon, but we are made to believe that “non-violent” methods are employed 
to the degree that the person is not subjected to bodily harm. We also gauge the 
psychological effects that confinement and coercion have on a person and 
whether these methods can be considered “passive.”133 
C. THE FUTURE OF JAPAN 
Japan’s objective is to be a pacifist nation, where violence is considered 
unnecessary, but in its quest to achieve this status, it has compromised the truth 
behind the term. Preservation of self-image is the cause of misreporting, 
falsification of statistics, and issuing unsubstantiated blame to foreigners and 
youths for the rise of crime. In order to avoid addressing unwanted aspects of 
society, the government chose an alliance with organized crime and has allowed 
it to embed itself as an accepted part of its culture. The pressure to ensure low 
clearance rates leads to questionable methods used by the authorities to secure 
confessions that are the sole evidence against a suspect. Even the approach to 
terrorism is one of apathy, as the government and society would rather be 
oblivious then commit to a stance against it.  
The study has tracked the growth of organized crime as a result of 
globalization from the Allied Occupation of Japan through the economic “Bubble 
Burst” of the 1990s. Forced restructuring of the government and the country’s 
legal infrastructure coupled with its industrial revolution caused major social shifts 
in the way Japanese police approached law enforcement. The reliance on 
pacifist norms and the lack of resources for the rebuilding country in the 1950s 
and 1960s forced a dependent relationship with gangs in order to maintain public 
order. Those gangs steadily evolved into organized crime syndicates, and as 
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Japan was introduced to the international economy, these boryokudan followed, 
expanding their own business scope. Methods have inevitably become more 
violent as a means to achieve its financial objectives and in response; the police 
will need to adapt its passive practices in order to counter the threat. 
Japan has been slow in responding to its problem of organized crime, but 
has come to realize the negative effects of globalized criminal activities and is 
now trying to contain the influence of the yakuza and foreign syndicates in the 
country and on an international level. Japan’s crime trends mirror those of other 
developed democratic nations, which occur after a period of industrialization and 
urbanization.134 Though stunted due to the post war occupation, the country will 
eventually reach the same level of social disorder and crime influx as 
experienced by other states. 
Japan prefers to concentrate its police and legal efforts on maintaining a 
relative “status quo” in regards to crime and terrorism, externally as well as 
internally. The country seems to only treat the symptoms of the problem instead 
of addressing the root problems of an ever-changing society. In recent decades, 
the country has experienced a dissolving of traditional social relations where in 
the near future, the Japanese will come to realize that its previous forms of 
dispute resolution based on pacifist norms and tactics has become increasingly 
ineffective.135 Attempting to maintain an image of a “pacifist” society will 
ultimately lead to a further break down of the justice system and not allow the 
authorities to adapt appropriately to future domestic and international threats. 
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